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Abstract
We extend previous theoretical work on n-player complete information all-pay auctions to
incorporate heterogeneous risk- and loss-averse utility functions. We provide sufficient and
necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with a given set of active players with any
strictly increasing utility functions and characterize the players’ equilibrium mixed strategies.
Assuming that players can be ordered by their risk aversion (player a is more risk-averse
than player b, if whenever player b prefers a certain payment over a given lottery, so does
player a), we find that in equilibrium, the more risk-averse players either bid higher than
the less risk-averse players and win with higher ex-ante probability – or they drop out.
Furthermore, while each player’s expected bid decreases with the other players’ risk aversion,
her expected bid increases with her own risk aversion. Thus, increasing a player’s risk
aversion creates two opposing effects on total expected bid. A sufficient condition for the
total expected bid to decrease with a player’s risk aversion is that this player is relatively more
risk-averse compared to the rest of the players. Our findings have important implications
for the literature on gender differences in competitiveness and for gender diversity in firms
that use personnel contests for promotions.
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1. Introduction
Sunk cost contests, where effort is unrecoverable, are pervasive (Frank and Cook, 2010).
All-pay auctions are those where the winners need only exert slightly higher effort to take
all. Indeed, all-pay auctions theory has been used to study many types of sunk cost contest
and tournaments, e.g., rent seeking contest and lobbying (Baye et al., 1993; Ellingsen, 1991;
Hillman and Riley, 1989), election campaigns (Che and Gale, 1998), R&D races (Dasgupta
et al., 1982), curved grades (Andreoni and Brownback, 2014), college admission (Hickman,
2014), and job promotion (Rosen, 1986). In these contests, the risk of lost effort, oppor-
tunities, or resources to individuals can be significant. Furthermore, even contests between
organizations, like firms, can involve significant loss to individuals to the extent that decisions
are made by CEOs and managers who care about the consequences of those decisions on
their own welfare through mechanisms such as options in compensation packages (Bertrand,
2009), and of course, in promotions and dismissals based upon relative performance. Het-
erogeneous risk aversion (e.g., as indicated by gender) could thus have a significant influence
on behavior.
Evidence is accumulating of a gender difference in risk aversion, where women are usu-
ally found to be more risk-averse than men (Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Borghans et al.,
2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). This gender difference emerges even before adolescence
(Khachatryan et al., 2015). A gender difference in risk attitude and its interactions with all-
pay auction incentives in the business world can help explain the paucity of women among
top executives (Bertrand, 2009), particularly in entrepreneurial settings (Coates et al., 2009).
However, despite the importance of observable differences in attitude towards risk in such
contests, the modeling of all-pay auction incentives has generally been limited to risk neutral
players or to specific tractable utility functional forms.
In order to fill the gap in the theory of all-pay auctions, we extend Baye, Kovenock,
and De Vries’s (1996) n-player, complete information all-pay auction model to incorporate
heterogeneous risk-averse players. We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for an
equilibrium with a given set of active players to exist and more importantly, closed-form
solutions to the equilibrium strategies for any strictly increasing utility functions. Assuming
that players can be ordered by their risk aversions (player a is more risk-averse than player
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b, if whenever player b prefers a certain payment over a given lottery, so does player a), we
derive novel comparative statics for equilibria in which active players randomize continuously
from 0 to the common value of the prize.
We find that, in equilibrium, the more risk-averse players either bid higher than the
less risk-averse players (in terms of first-order stochastic dominance of their mixed strategy
cumulative distribution) and win with higher ex-ante probability – or they drop out. When
players are homogeneous in their risk aversion, the total expected bid decreases with their
risk aversion. We also find, in the heterogeneous risk aversion case, that while each player’s
expected bid decreases with the other players’ risk aversion, her expected bid increases with
her own risk aversion. Thus, increasing a player’s risk aversion creates two opposing effects
on total expected bid. A sufficient condition for the total expected bid to decrease with a
player’s risk aversion is that this player is relatively more risk-averse compared to the rest
of the players.
Our findings have important implications for the gender differences in competitiveness
literature. With only two risk aversion types of players, e.g., men and women, we show that
the total expected bid decreases monotonically with the share of the more risk-averse players,
when the difference between the two types is not too large. Moreover, our findings suggest
the possibility that if women are more risk-averse than men, they can simultaneously work
harder than men and decrease everyone’s effort in the firm in personnel contests that have
an all-pay auction structure. In these contests, if men and women are not too different in
their levels of risk aversions, then a higher share of women may lead to increased odds of
a specific woman dropping out. We discuss the specific results in the gender differences in
competitiveness literature that these findings can help explain after the main results.
1.1. Literature review
As is always the case with equilibria of complete information all-pay auctions with more
than two players, there is no uniqueness of the equilibrium. In fact, there is a continuum of
equilibria as in Baye et al. (1996); Siegel (2009); Barut and Kovenock (1998), and Hillman
and Samet (1987). Some of the active players may be randomizing over a sub-interval of
the form [b, v]. As is the case with risk neutral players, these b’s are arbitrary. Varying the
3
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b’s and the set of active players generates the continuum of equilibria. We generalize Baye
et al. (1996) equilibrium strategies for risk/loss-averse players. We also generalize Chen et al.
(2015) from two players with heterogeneous risk aversion to n players.
Siegel (2009) studies a very general environment that also allows for risk-averse players.
However, his “power condition” for a generic contest does not hold in our environment. The
power of a player (in our setting) is defined as her utility at zero. The power condition
states that only one of the players has a power of zero. However, if we assume that the
utility of each player is zero at zero, then all players have a power of zero, and the condition
is violated. If we do not make this assumption, then our model does not comply with
Assumption 2 in Siegel (2009). In either case, we cannot use his results to identify all the
equilibria of our all-pay auction. When players are homogenous in their risk aversion, we
can conclude from Corollary 3 in Siegel (2009) that all the equilibria are of the form that we
find in this paper. Hillman and Samet (1987) also solve for an equilibrium with risk-averse
players when all players are homogenous in their risk aversion. They characterize the unique
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies and show that in the presence of risk aversion,
rent dissipation is incomplete. Our results characterize all the equilibria for homogenous risk
aversion players.
For incomplete information (private value) all-pay contests, Fibich et al. (2006) show that
risk aversion has different effects on different types of players. Low value types bid lower
and high value types bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. Moreover, they
show, as we do, that the seller’s expected payoff in the risk-averse case may be either higher
or lower than in the risk neutral case.
Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) analyze pure strategy equilibrium with heterogeneous
risk-averse players, also in an incomplete information setting. They allow for heterogeneity
in both the risk preferences and the supports of the distributions from which the private
values are drawn. Our model can be thought of as a limiting case of their model when
all supports contain only one point (the same for all players). Thus, our results often echo
theirs. First, Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) characterize conditions for a given set of players
to be active on a given support, as we do. Moreover, they show that with at least three
heterogeneously risk-averse contestants, some might drop out either partially or completely.
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This is identical to our mixed strategy equilibria of the complete information (common
value) case where some players may randomize on a sub-interval of the interval from zero
to the common value, and some players may drop out completely. They also show, as we
do, that more risk-averse players are more aggressive in their bidding in terms of first-order
stochastic dominance of the bid function, at least in some neighborhoods of zero and of the
highest bid. Most importantly, they show that with two types of risk aversions, if the risk-
averse players are sufficiently risk-averse, then in any equilibrium, at least one contestant
uses a discontinuous strategy: a mass of low valuation types drops out from the contest,
high valuation types place high bids, but no types place low bids. This gives rise to bid
bifurcation, where only bids at zero or bids above a threshold are observed for some players.
Analogously, in our setting a player may randomize continuously on a sub-interval [b, v] for
some b > 0 (where v is the common value) and put a positive mass on bidding zero. The
main difference between the papers is that in our complete information setting, we are able
to analytically derive the bid functions while Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) characterize
only some of its properties. This allows us to derive results on the behavior of players with
different risk attitudes and comparative statics on different aspects of the model.
Klose and Schweinzer (2014) analyze incomplete information all-pay auctions with sym-
metric variance-averse players. They assume a specific utility function which is increasing in
the player’s expected payoff and decreasing in the variance of the payoff. They characterize
the equilibrium bid functions and show that variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to
predict that high-valuation players increase their bids relative to the risk-neutral case while
low types decrease their bid.
2. The model
There are m players who have a common valuation, v1 = · · · = vm = v for the prize1.
Denote by M the set of players. Players compete in an all-pay auction for one prize by
submitting a bid (exerting an effort): xi. The vector of bids is denoted (x1, x2, . . . , xm). The
1Our model can be trivially extended to the case in which one player has a higher valuation, while all
other players have the same lower valuation. However, when there are finite many possible valuations, the
interaction between valuation and risk attitude significantly complicates the model. We leave this for future
work.
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payoff function in an all-pay auction is given by:
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
 −xi if ∃j, xj > xiv − xi if xj < xi for all j .
Moreover, there exists some tie-breaking rule to determine the winner in case there is
more than one player with the highest bid. Any tie-breaking rule is applicable in our model.
We assume that players are risk/loss-averse with strictly increasing utility functions which we
denote by U1(x), U2(x), . . . , Um(x). These utilities are common knowledge and potentially
different from each other. We discuss two cases separately: 1) risk-averse and 2) loss-
averse. For case 1), we assume only continuity and concavity of the strictly increasing utility
functions. For case 2), we assume that the utility functions take the following form:
Ui(x) =

gi (x) if x > 0
0 if x = 0
li (x) if x < 0
, (1)
where the utility from gains, gi(x) is a strictly increasing concave function while the utility
from losses, li(x) is a convex function, and both are continuous in their domains.
In this paper, we focus on mixed strategy equilibria. In any such equilibria, any active
player (a player who bids a positive amount with positive probability) i is indifferent between
all the bids in her equilibrium support. Formally, that means,
ρUi(v − x) + (1− ρ)Ui(−x) = Ui(CEi (x, b−i)), (2)
where x is in the support of the player’s equilibrium strategy, ρ denotes the probability that
player i wins when she bids x, and CEi (x, b−i) is the certainty equivalent of bidding x given
the other players bid b−i. We can rewrite equation (2) as:
Pr(i wins|x, b−i) = ρ = Ui(CEi)− Ui(−x)
Ui(v − x)− Ui(−x) .
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We define KUi(x) to facilitate the analysis of the mixed strategy equilibria:
KUi(x) =
Ui(0)− Ui(−x)
Ui(v − x)− Ui(−x) .
Note that KUi(x) is strictly increasing in x with KUi(0) = 0 and KUi(v) = 1. In our analysis
of equilibria, we examine equilibria with the same structure as in Baye et al. (1996) in which
all players have v in the support of their equilibrium mixed strategy and no player has an
atom at v. In this case, bidding v yields a certain payoff of zero. Therefore, each player
is indifferent between any bid in her support and a certain payoff of zero. The equilibrium
probability of winning that makes player i indifferent between bidding x > 0 and receiving
a certain payoff of zero is equal to KUi(x). We sometimes abuse notation and write KUi(x)
as Ki(x), and we refer to Ki(x) as player i’s “contest risk preference” for reasons below.
In what follows, we exploit the following important property of KUi(x). Its magnitude
depends only on player i’s risk attitude and not on any other players’ risk attitude or bids.
As is usually the case with mixed-strategy equilibria, since KUi(x) denotes the probability
that player i wins by submitting a positive bid x, this probability is pinned down by the
preferences of player i alone. We show that KUi(x) is monotonic in player i’s risk aversion
in the lemma below. All proofs are in the Appendix. We first define increasing risk aversion
and increasing loss aversion.
Definition 1 A concave utility function U(·) represents a more risk-averse player than the
concave utility function U˜(·), if for any lottery l over a set of prizes Z, the lottery’s certainty
equivalent is smaller under U than under U˜ . In that case, we say that the risk aversion of
the player increases from U˜ to U .
Definition 2 For a player with a utility function U(·) of the form (1), a convex loss-averse
function l(·) represents a more loss-averse player than the convex function l˜(·), if l (x) < l˜ (x)
for all x < 0.
Lemma 1 If Ui (x) is concave, then for any x ∈ (0, v), Ki(x) increases with player i’s risk
aversion, i.e., if Ui represents a more risk-averse player than U˜i, then KUi(x) > KU˜i(x) for
any x ∈ (0, v). When players are both risk- and loss-averse, as described above by the utility
7
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function of the form (1), then for any x, Ki(x) increases with player i’s loss aversion.
Note that Lemma 1 above also suggests that the K(x) function of different players never
cross if the players can be ordered by their risk or loss aversions. The following is an example
of the contest risk preference function K(x) when the player has CARA utility function:
Example 1 If a player has CARA utility function: Ui(c) = 1 − e−βic and v = 1, then
Ki(x) =
1−e−βix
1−e−βi . In this case, player i is more risk-averse than player j iff βi > βj. In figure
1, we plot Ki(x) for β = 1 (black solid), 2 (green dotted), and 3 (red dashed).
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 10.80.60.40.2
K(x)
x
Figure 1: Contest risk preference function K(x) increases with risk aversion.
In fact, the sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibrium and the
closed-form expressions for the mixed strategies that we provide in the next section, rely only
on the assumption that the utility functions are strictly increasing, i.e., utility functions do
not have to be rankable by their certainty equivalent. The rest of the results apply to any
utility function that is rankable by certainty equivalent, irrespective of whether the utility
function is risk-averse, loss-averse, or even risk seeking. All the results with risk-loving
players can be derived analogously, as long as the more risk-loving utilities have a higher
certainty equivalent than the less risk-loving utilities for every lottery. We focus only on
risk- and loss-averse utilities due to their ubiquity in the literature.
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3. Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence
of an equilibrium with a given structure and a given set of active players, and then, we
characterize the mixed strategies in these equilibria. We also highlight some interesting
features of the equilibria in the Subsection 3.2. In discussing these features, for simplicity,
we focus only on the equilibria in which all active players randomize on the entire interval
[0, v].
3.1. Existence and closed-form solution
Our first proposition, Proposition 1 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of an equilibrium in which a given subset of players is active. We start by
defining an active player.
Definition 3 A player is active when she bids zero with a probability strictly less than 1. A
player is inactive when she bids zero with probability 1.
Denote the set of active players by B ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. For convenience and without loss of
generality, we assign i = 1, 2, ..., |B| as the index for the active players. Denote by Gi(x) the
CDF of player i’s mixed strategy and by αi(0) the mass player i puts on the bid zero. The
equilibrium of the all-pay auction, has the following structure (as with risk neutral players):
1. Players i = 1, 2, . . . , h, where 2 6 h 6 |B|, randomize continuously over [0, v] and have
αi (0) = 0;
2. Players i = h+ 1, h+ 2, . . . , |B| randomize continuously over [bi, v] and put a mass of
αi(0) at zero, with 0 = bh < bh+1 6 bh+2 6 . . . 6 b|B| 6 b|B|+1 = v;
3. Players j = |B|+ 1, . . . ,m are inactive, i.e., αj(0) = 1.
Baye et al. (1996) showed that there is a continuum of equilibria, as the parameters
bh+1, bh+2, . . . , b|B| can be chosen arbitrarily, and these determine the size of αi (0). We
now characterize the equilibrium strategy with the same structure but with heterogeneous
risk/loss-averse players.
In our setting, this implies that player i’s (∀i ∈ B) expected utility must be equal to Ui(0)
when bidding in his equilibrium support. Note that only players i 6 t, for t = h, . . . , |B|
9
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randomize in the interval [bt, bt+1]. Thus, for player i 6 t and ∀x ∈ [bt, bt+1], we have in
equilibrium:
 ∏
l 6=i,16l6t
Gl(x)
∏
t<l6|B|
αl(0)
Ui(v−x)+
1− ∏
l 6=i,16l6t
Gl(x)
∏
t<l6|B|
αl(0)
Ui(−x) = Ui(0). (3)
Recall that Gl(x) is the probability player l 6= i bids lower than x, and αl(0) is the probability
that player l bids zero, so
∏
l 6=i,16l6tGl(x)
∏
t<l6|B|αl(0) is player i’s probability of winning
when bidding x. Thus
∏
l 6=i,16l6t
Gl(x)
∏
t<l6|B|
αl(0) = Ki(x).
We solve this system of t equations and get the equilibrium strategy of player i 6 t:
Gi(x) =
(∏
l 6=i,16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B|αl(0)
) 1
t−1
Ki(x)
− t−2
t−1 , (4)
where i 6 t and x ∈ [bt, bt+1]. Recall that for player t we have αt (0) = Gt (bt). By a similar
procedure, we can characterize the entire equilibrium:
• For x ∈ [b|B|, v]
Gi (x) =
 ∏
16l6|B|
Kl(x)
 1|B|−1 Ki(x)−1, (5)
where i = 1, . . . , |B|.
• For t = h+ 1, h+ 2, . . . , |B| − 1, we have for x ∈ [bt, bt+1]
Gi (x) =
( ∏
16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B|αl(0)
) 1
t−1
Ki(x)
−1, (6)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , t; and
Gk(x) = αk(0), (7)
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where k = t+ 1, . . . , |B|.
• Finally, for x ∈ [0, bh+1]
Gi(x) =
( ∏
16l6hKl(x)∏
h<l6|B|αl(0)
) 1
h−1
Ki(x)
−1, (8)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , h; and
Gk(x) = αk(0), (9)
where k = h+ 1, . . . ,m.
There are three sets of constraints to ensure that the above strategy profile is indeed an
equilibrium. First, the players who do not bid some x ∈ [bt, bt+1] in equilibrium must find it
unprofitable to do so; Second, the players who bid x ∈ [bt, bt+1] in equilibrium must have a
feasible CDF at x, i.e., between zero and one; Third, all the CDFs must be non-decreasing
in x.
To find the first set of constraints, we first calculate the probability of winning of a player
j, for t < j 6 |B| who deviates to a bid x ∈ [bt, bt+1]:
∏
16i6t
Gi (x)
∏
t<l6|B|,l 6=j
αl(0) =
∏
i6t
( ∏16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B|αl(0)
) 1
t−1
Ki(x)
−1
∏t<l6|B|αl(0)
αj(0)
=
( ∏
16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B|αl(0)
) 1
t−1
1
αj(0)
.
Thus, we need ∏
16i6t
Gi (x)
∏
t<l6|B|,l 6=j
αl(0) 6 Kj(x)
or ∏
16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B|αl(0)
6 (αj(0)Kj(x))t−1 (10)
to guarantee that player j finds it unprofitable to bid x ∈ [bt, bt+1], as Kj(x) is the required
probability of winning for player j to be indifferent between bidding x and receiving a payoff
11
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0 for sure. Note that if j is inactive, |B| < j, then αj(0) = 1. We refer to this set of
constraints as the Incentive Constraints.
We find the second set of constraints by restricting the Gi(x) given by (6) to satisfy
Gi(x) 6 1 for all i 6 t and x ∈ [bt, bt+1]2:∏
16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B| αl(0)
6 Ki (x)t−1 . (11)
We refer to this set of constraints as the Feasibility Constraints.
Combining the two sets of constraints, (10) and (11), we have:∏
16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B| αl(0)
6 min
{
min
16i6t
Ki (x)
t−1 , min
t<j6m
[αj(0)Kj(x)]
t−1
}
, (12)
for all t = h, h+ 1, . . . , |B|, and for all x ∈ [bt, bt+1].
The third set of constraints are derived by ensuring that the first-order derivatives of
Gi(x) for all x ∈ [bt, bt+1] are non-negative in the interval. Since
dGi (x)
dx
=
( ∏
16l6tKl(x)∏
t<l6|B| αl(0)
) 1
t−1
1
(t− 1)Ki (x)
(
t∑
l=1,l 6=i
K ′l (x)
Kl (x)
− (t− 2) K
′
i (x)
Ki (x)
)
,
the constraint is
t∑
l=1
K ′l (x)
Kl (x)
> (t− 1) K
′
i (x)
Ki (x)
, (13)
for all t = h, h+ 1, . . . , |B|, i = 1, ..., t and x ∈ [bt, bt+1].
Proposition 1 An equilibrium with the strategy profile (5)-(9) exists if and only if the con-
ditions (12) and (13) are satisfied.
The condition (13) restricts the level of risk/loss aversion of the players who bid in the
interval [bt, bt+1], whereas condition (12) imposes restrictions on both active and inactive
players. Intuitively, for an equilibrium to exist, the active players cannot be too averse to
risk/loss. See the following example for the importance of these conditions.
2All Gi(x) are no less than zero since all K(x) functions are non-negative by definition.
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Example 2 Assume there are three players with CARA utility functions Ui (x) = 1− e−βix
and a valuation v = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Assume that β3 = 1, β2 = 2, β1 = 10. Then,
there exists no equilibrium in which all three players are active and all randomize con-
tinuously on [0, 1], since the condition is violated on [0.13035, 1]. Specifically, we have
G3 (x) = (K1(x)K2 (x))
1
2 K3(x)
− 1
2 =
(
1−e−2x
1−e−2
1−e−10x
1−e−10
) 1
2
(
1−e−x
1−e−1
)− 1
2
, which is larger than 1 for
x > 0.13035. However, there exists an equilibrium in which only players 2 and 3 are active
and they randomize continuously on the interval [0, 1] according to the following strategies:
G2 (x) = K3(x) =
1−e−x
1−e−1 and G3 (x) = K2 (x) =
1−e−2x
1−e−2 , since then, all the conditions hold.
Similar to the risk neutral setting, there is also a continuum of equilibria when players
are heterogeneously risk/loss-averse. Unlike in the risk neutral setting, players may stay
inactive due to the their higher risk/loss aversion. This fact does not restrict the power of
our theory in making predictions either for empirical or experimental data, since in reality
we can generally observe the number of active players, especially if players play over multiple
rounds.
Unlike the risk neutral setting, even if we focus only on the equilibria in which all active
players randomize in the full support [0, v], there always exists multiple equilibria3 (see
Corollary 1 below).
Corollary 1 Suppose all players can be ranked by their risk aversions: K1 (x) > K2 (x) >
. . . > Km (x) for all x ∈ [0, v], then there always exists equilibria in which only players i and
m are active, where i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m− 1} and randomize continuously on [0, v].
This corollary follows directly from Proposition 1. Condition (12) is automatically sat-
isfied since there are only two active players and one of them is the least risk-averse player,
m. Condition (13) is satisfied due to the fact that all contest risk preference functions K(x)
are increasing in x.
3In the risk neutral setting, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all players fully ran-
domize within [0, v]. See Baye et al. (1996) for details.
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3.2. Some features of equilibria
Here we focus on equilibria in which all active players randomize continuously on [0, v].
Assume that B = {1, ..., |B|} is the active set. Then, the conditions for such an equilibrium
to exist are: ∏
16l6|B|
Kl (x) 6 min
16i6m
Ki (x)
|B|−1 ,
for all x ∈ [0, v] and
|B|∑
l=1
K ′l (x)
Kl (x)
> (|B| − 1) K
′
i (x)
Ki (x)
,
for all i = 1, ..., |B| and x ∈ [0, v]. In this case, player i’s, i = 1, ..., |B|, equilibrium strategy
is given by
Gi (x) =
 ∏
16l6|B|
Kl(x)
 1|B|−1 Ki(x)−1. (14)
In real life competitions, it is not uncommon for participants to differ in observable
characteristics like gender, ethnicity, culture...etc. It is then important to examine whether
risk attitudes associated with these characteristics help to explain differences in competitive
behavior. For example, women are under-represented in the elites of many competitive
industries (Bertrand, 2009), yet women are also more likely to achieve academic success
(Angrist et al., 2009; DiPrete and Buchmann, 2013; Fortin et al., 2015)4. Importantly, our
results below are consistent with this empirical evidence.
Corollary 2 If there exists an equilibrium where the set of all active players, B, randomize
continuously on the interval [0, v], and these players can be ranked by their risk aversions:
K1 (x) > K2 (x) > . . . > K|B| (x) for all x ∈ [0, v], then the cumulative distribution function
of player s’s strategy first-order stochastically dominates that of player t for every t > s. In
particular, the players’ expected bids have the same ranking as their levels of risk aversion.
Corollary 2 suggests that more risk-averse players bid higher in expectation than less
risk-averse players among all active players. Given that the more risk-averse a player is,
the higher she bids conditional on her being active in equilibrium, one may expect that her
4See detailed discussion and literature review in Section 5.
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probability of winning is also higher. Corollary 3 indicates that this conjecture is generally
but not always true.
Corollary 3 Assume an equilibrium where all active players (in the set B) randomize con-
tinuously on the interval [0, v]. For any two active players, s, t ∈ B, player s’s probability
of winning is higher or equal to that of player t if Kt(x) dominates Ks(x) in terms of the
reverse hazard rate, i.e.,
K′t(x)
Kt(x)
> K′s(x)
Ks(x)
for all x ∈ [0, v].
Note that Ks(x), Kt(x) are also the joint cumulative distributions of opponents’ bids that
players s and t are competing against (i.e., Πl∈B,l 6=sGl (x) = Ks (x)), respectively. Corollary
3 suggests that the more risk-averse player s is, the more likely she is to win the contest
compared to player t, if in player t’s view (as measured by Kt(x)) the contest is sufficiently
more competitive (i.e., dominates in terms of reverse hazard rate) than in player s’s view
(as measured by Ks(x)). Example 3 below suggests that the CARA utility functions satisfy
the condition given in Corollary 3. In other words, if players have CARA utility functions,
then the more risk-averse a player is, the more likely she is to win ex-ante.
Example 3 Suppose player i (∀i ∈ B) has CARA utility function Ui(x) = 1 − e−βix and
v = 1, thus, she has Ki(x) =
1−e−βix
1−e−βi . Take the derivative of K
′
i(x)/Ki(x) w.r.t. βi, we have
∂
(
K′i(x)
Ki(x)
)
∂βi
= − e
−βix
(e−βix − 1)2
(
e−βix + βix− 1
)
< 0.
The above derivative is negative because
(
e−βix + βix− 1
)
increases in x, its derivative w.r.t.
x is positive for ∀x ∈ (0, 1], and it is equal to 0 when x = 0.
Interestingly, the more risk-averse players not only bid higher and win with higher prob-
ability, they are also more likely to drop out in the following sense.
Corollary 4 Assume an equilibrium where all active players (in the set B ) randomize con-
tinuously on the interval [0, v]. If for some i ∈ B and j /∈ B, we have Ki(x) > Kj(x) for all
x ∈ [0, v], then the existence of the equilibrium with the set B of active players implies the
existence of another equilibrium with the set B˜ of active players who randomize continuously
on the interval [0, v], where B˜ = (B ∪ {j}) \ {i}.
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Corollary 4 suggests that the conditions for the existence of the equilibrium in which a
relatively more risk-averse player bids actively is sufficient for the existence of the equilibrium
in which a less risk-averse player bids actively, holding all other active and inactive players
constant, but the opposite is not necessarily true. This implies that mere differences in risk
attitudes can result in different non-entry/drop out decisions, without having heterogeneity
in valuations or incomplete information. The player with the higher risk aversion may not
participate in the competition because she finds that the potential return from bidding any
positive amount does not sufficiently compensate her for the risk.
One implication of this finding is that the well established gender difference in risk aver-
sion alone may be sufficient to explain differences in participation rates found in gender
differences in competitiveness experiments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007)5, without the
need to hypothesize gender differences in competitiveness, confidence, or other characteris-
tics.
A question naturally follows: are the players who drop out always those who are more
risk-averse than the active ones? The answer is not necessarily. Example 4 suggests there
might exist equilibria in which players with the intermediate risk aversion drops out.
Example 4 Assume there are three players with CARA utility functions Ui (x) = 1− e−βix
and a valuation v = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Assume also that β1 = 2, β2 = 1, β3 =
1
2
. Then, there
exists an equilibrium in which only players 1 and 3 are active, while player 2 is inactive. The
conditions for this equilibrium to exist are:
K1(x)K3(x) =
1− e−2x
1− e−2
1− e− 12x
1− e− 12 6 min{K1(x), K2(x), K3(x)} = K3(x) =
1− e− 12x
1− e− 12
and that the Gi(x) functions are strictly increasing for players 1 and 3, which follows directly
from K1(x) and K3(x) being increasing functions. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in which
the most and the least risk-averse players are active while the player with the intermediary
risk aversion is inactive.
5These papers examine entry into what are in effect all-pay auctions to measure gender differences in
competitiveness. See Niederle (2014) for a recent survey.
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4. Comparative statics
We now discuss the effect of increasing players’ risk aversion on their expected bids. Our
results in this section are derived for the equilibrium in which all active players randomize
continuously in [0, v]. Subsection 4.1 shows that if players are homogeneous in their risk
attitude, then increasing all players’ risk aversion decreases the total expected bid. Subsec-
tion 4.2, in contrast, shows that in the case with heterogeneous risk aversion, each player’s
expected bid increases with her own risk aversion, though it still decreases with other active
players’ risk aversions.
4.1. Homogeneous risk aversion
The equilibrium strategy with homogeneous risk aversion is a special case of the equi-
librium strategy with heterogeneous risk aversion derived above. When players are homo-
geneous in their risk aversion, we can generalize the proof of Baye et al. (1996) and prove
that all equilibria are of the form described in Proposition 16. In this case, there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium in which all players randomize continuously on [0, v], as well as many
asymmetric equilibria. We, again, focus on equilibria in which all active players random-
ize on the interval [0, v]. We first examine how the players’ behavior change when they all
become more risk-averse.
Proposition 2 Assume all players are homogeneous, then there exists an equilibrium where
a set B of players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v], and all other players are
inactive. If all the players’ risk aversion increases homogeneously, then their bids in the
equilibrium in which the same set B of players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v]
decrease in terms of first-order stochastic dominance.
We illustrate Proposition 2 with the following example.
Example 5 Assume there are three players, each with the CARA utility function: Ui (x) =
1 − e−βx and valuation v = 1. Figure 2 shows the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy
when β = 1 (black solid), 5 (green dotted), and 10 (red dashed). It is clear that as all players
6The details of this proof are left out of this paper but can be given by the authors upon request.
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become more risk-averse, the distribution function of their bids decreases in terms of first-
order stochastic dominance, i.e., the probability that they bid below x for any x ∈ [0, v] is
higher when they are more risk-averse. The total expected bid decreases from 0.812 to 0.357
and then to 0.184.
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 10.80.60.40.2
G(x)
x
Figure 2: Homogeneously increasing all players’ risk aversion decreases G(x).
In the complete information all-pay auction with homogenous risk-averse players, the
total expected bid, therefore, decreases in the players’ risk aversion. As all players become
more risk-averse, they require better odds of winning in order to be compensated for the
same risk. To maintain each others’ indifference conditions, as required by equilibrium, all
players bid lower in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, in order to compensate
each other for the greater disutility of risk.
4.2. Heterogeneous risk aversion
In this section, we first show in Proposition 3 that each player’s expected bid increases
with her own risk aversion, but decreases with other active players’ risk aversions. Given this
result, we characterize the sufficient condition for the total expected bid to decrease when the
more risk-averse player becomes even more risk-averse in Proposition 4. We again assume
that players can be ordered according to their risk aversion. Without loss of generality, let
K1(x) > K2(x) > . . . > Km(x) for all x ∈ [0, v], so that player 1 is the most risk-averse
player.
18
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Proposition 3 Assume there exists an equilibrium where a set B of players randomize con-
tinuously on the interval [0, v] and all other players are inactive. Assume, furthermore,
that the level of risk aversion for some player i ∈ B has increased, i.e., Ki (x) changes to
K˜i (x) > Ki (x) for every x ∈ [0, v]. Assume that after this change, there still exists an
equilibrium where the set B of players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v] , and all
other players are inactive. Then, the expected bid of player i increases with her level of risk
aversion, while the expected bid of player k for k ∈ B, k 6= i decreases with player i’s level of
risk aversion.
The following example illustrates this result.
Example 6 Assume there are three players with CARA utility functions Ui = 1−e−βic with
β1 = 1, β2 = 0.5, β3 = 0.1 and valuation v = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Then, player 1 is the most risk
averse and K1 (x) > K2 (x) > K3 (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. In the equilibrium in which all three
players are active and randomize continuously on the interval [0, 1], the equilibrium strategies
of the players (the CDFs of their mixed strategies) are given in the left panel of figure 3: G1(x)
(black) 6 G2(x) (green) 6 G3(x) (red). Assume now that β1 changes to β˜1 = 1.2, then the
players strategies change to the dashed lines as in the right panel of figure 3. It can be seen
that player 1’s mixed strategy (black) increases to G˜1(x) 6 G1(x) while players 2’s (green)
and 3’s (red) mixed strategy decreases to G˜2(x) > G2(x) and G˜3(x) > G3(x) in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance, respectively.
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 10.80.60.40.2
G(x)
x
G3(x)
G1(x)
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 10.80.60.40.2
G(x)
x
G˜3(x)
G˜1(x)
Figure 3: A player’s bid increases with her own risk aversion and decreases with other players’ risk aversions.
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Next, we discuss the effect of a change in the risk attitude of an active player on the
total expected bid in equilibrium. We first interpret the intuition behind Proposition 3. In
a mixed strategy equilibrium, any active player t is made indifferent between any of his bids
by the strategies of the other players. When player t becomes even slightly more risk-averse,
the other players have to lower their bids to ensure player t stays indifferent (in order for an
equilibrium with the same set of active players to continue to exist). Thus, by equilibrium
strategy (4), increasing t’s risk aversion has two effects on total expected bid, fixing the same
set of active players:
1. Player t bids higher, since the CDF of her new equilibrium strategy first-order stochas-
tically dominates the CDF of her original equilibrium strategy, before she became more
risk-averse;
2. The rest of the players bid lower when Kt(x) increases, since their CDFs decrease in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
The net effect on total expected bids is not obvious. We provide in Proposition 4 a
sufficient condition for the total expected bid to decrease when one player’s risk aversion
increases, assuming the equilibrium with the same set of active players still exists after the
increase of the player’s risk aversion.
Proposition 4 Assume an equilibrium with a set B of active players who randomize con-
tinuously on the interval [0, v]. For an active player i, if
Ki(x) >
|B| − 2∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1 , (15)
for all x ∈ [0, v], then the total expected bid decreases in i’s risk aversion.
Note that the r.h.s. of (15) can be rewritten as the harmonic mean of the K(x) functions
of the rest of the active players multiplied by a constant:
|B| − 2∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1 =
|B| − 1∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1
|B| − 2
|B| − 1.
Thus, condition (15) requires that player i be sufficiently risk averse compared to the rest
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of the active players to guarantee that an increase in her risk aversion decreases the total
expected bid. See example 7 for an illustration of Proposition 4.
Example 7 Assume there are three players B = {1, 2, 3} who have CARA utility functions
with β1 = 2, β2 = 1, β3 =
1
2
, and valuation v = 1. Then, K1(x) =
1−e−2x
1−e−2 , K2(x) =
1−e−x
1−e−1 ,
and K3(x) =
1−e− 12x
1−e− 12
. Note that the condition (15) for i = 1 is satisfied:
K1(x) =
1− e−2x
1− e−2 >
(
1− e− 12
1− e− 12x +
1− e−1
1− e−x
)−1
=
(
K2(x)
−1 +K3(x)−1
)−1
and the total expected bid in the equilibrium in which all three players are active and ran-
domize continuously on [0, 1] is:
3−
∫ 1
0
(K2(x)K3(x))
1
2 (K1(x))
− 1
2 dx−
∫ 1
0
(K1(x)K3(x))
1
2 (K2(x))
− 1
2 dx
−
∫ 1
0
(K1(x)K2(x))
1
2 (K3(x))
− 1
2 dx = 0.779.
Assume now that we increase player 1’s risk aversion to β1 = 3, then the total expected bid
decreases to 0.723.
Many real-life competitions are composed of participants with evidently different risk
attitudes, e.g., mixed gender contests. We now analyze how the risk attitude composition of
contests with two different risk types affects participation. Formally, assume there are two
sets of contestants in the competition: type 1 players with the contest risk preference K1(x),
and type 2 players with the contest risk preference K2(x). There are m players in total. Let
n be the number of type 1 players, with n < m. All players have the same valuation v for
the prize and K1 (x) > K2 (x) for all x ∈ (0, v). Type 1 players are thus more risk-averse
than type 2 players.
Corollary 5 For any 1
m
6 n
m
6 1, there exists an equilibrium in which all players randomize
continuously on the interval [0, v] if and only if
K1(x)
m 6 K2(x)m−1, (16)
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for all x ∈ [0, v].
Corollary 5 establishes that there always exists an equilibrium with all players active for
any n
m
∈ [0, 1], when the inequality (16) is satisfied, i.e., when the more risk averse players are
not too risk-averse compared to the less risk-averse players. Given that such an equilibrium
exists, Corollary 6 then provides a sufficient condition for the total expected bid in such an
equilibrium to decrease with n
m
(the share of the more risk-averse players).
Corollary 6 When there are two risk-averse types of players, with K1 (x) > K2 (x), for
x ∈ (0, v), assume condition (16) in Corollary 5 is satisfied. Then the total expected bid is
monotonically decreasing with the share of the K1(x) players,
n
m
, if
K2(x) >
m− 2
m− 1K1(x). (17)
Corollary 6 explicates the transition in terms of total revenue from the case where all
players are homogeneously less risk-averse to the case where all players are homogeneously
more risk-averse. As the share of the more risk-averse players increases, the total expected
bid decreases monotonically. According to (17), this is true if the two types of players are
not too different, as
K1(x) > K2(x) >
m− 2
m− 1K1(x)
has to hold.
5. Discussion
5.1. Asymmetric valuation
The literature on complete information all-pay auctions with risk neutral players has
traditionally allowed for heterogeneity in valuations of the prize. Here, we compare hetero-
geneity in risk aversion to heterogeneity of valuation. Assume two sets of valuations such
that vh = v1 = ... = vn > vn+1 = ... = vm = vl and compare to a common value v but
two sets of risk-averse players, i.e., K1 (x) = ... = Kn (x) > Kn+1 (x) = .... = Km (x) for all
x ∈ [0, v]. All the results for the risk neutral case are found in Baye et al. (1996).
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First, observe that if n ≥ 2, only the players with the high valuation are active in any
equilibrium with risk neutral players and two different valuations. However, in our setting
both the more risk-averse players and the less risk-averse players may be active in equilibrium.
This phenomena is also true with more types of players. For v1 > v2 > v3 > ... > vm, in
any equilibrium only players 1 and 2 are active while in the risk averse case with K1 (x) >
K2 (x) > K3 (x) > ... > Km (x) all players may be active.
Moreover, if n = 1 then in the risk neutral setting, there exists a continuum of equilibria.
In any equilibrium, bidder 1 randomizes continuously on the interval [0, vl]. Each bidder
i, i ∈ {2, ...,m}, employs a strategy Gi with support contained in [0, vl] that has an atom
αi (0) at 0. The size of the atom may differ across bidders, but Π
m
i=2αi (0) =
vh−vl
vl
. Each Gi
is characterized by a number bi > 0, where bi = 0 for at least one i 6= 1, such that Gi (x) =
αi (0), for all x ∈ [0, bi] and bidder i randomizes continuously on (bi, vl]. Furthermore, when
two or more bidders in the set {2, ...,m} randomize continuously on a common interval, their
CDFs are identical on that interval. Finally, in any equilibrium bidder 1 earns an expected
payoff of vh − vl, while each of the bidders 2, ...,m earns an expected payoff of zero.
In the risk-averse case, we examine equilibria with the feature that all players randomize
on an interval contained in [0, v] and may have an atom at zero. This is similar to the risk
neutral case where they all randomize on an interval contained in [0, vl] and may have an
atom at zero. However, in our setting all bidders have a payoff of zero in any equilibrium,
including the less risk-averse players (the “strong” players). Moreover, weak bidders (more
risk-averse) do not necessarily have an atom at zero, while in the risk neutral case, some
of them must have an atom so that Πmi=2αi (0) =
vh−vl
vl
. In the risk-averse setting, it is also
true that when two or more bidders with the same risk aversion randomize continuously on
a common interval, their CDFs are identical on that interval.
We can also compare the effects of changes in players’ preferences (i.e., valuation for the
prize in the risk neutral case, and risk aversion in the risk-averse case) on the expected total
effort. Given an equilibrium of the risk neutral all-pay auction with valuations vl and vh,
and assuming that all bidders randomize on the same interval (starting from the same bi)
before and after the increase, an increase in vl necessarily increases the expected total effort.
However, as we show in Proposition 4, increasing the risk aversion of a more risk-averse
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player may either decrease or increase the expected total effort depending on how much
more risk-averse she is than the rest of the players. Therefore, heterogeneous risk aversion
gives rise to different predictions on the behavior of the players. These can be empirically
tested7.
5.2. Gender difference
Our findings suggest the possibility that the higher risk aversion of women and girls can
simultaneously lead them to avoid participating in all-pay auction type incentives while bid-
ding higher and having a higher probability of winning than men and boys, when they do
participate. Heterogeneous risk aversion, therefore, could be an important factor in explain-
ing many of the stylized facts about gender differences in competitiveness, including women’s
greater reluctance to enter contests with all-pay auction incentives, like elections, unless they
have a good chance of winning (Fulton et al., 2006), girls’ greater willingness to exert effort
in preparation (Duckworth and Seligman, 2006) and their higher odds of success in academic
contests (Angrist et al., 2009; DiPrete and Buchmann, 2013; Fortin et al., 2015), and women’s
greater reluctance to enter laboratory contests (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), where they
cannot assure themselves success through extra pre-experiment preparation. Moreover, at
present, the experimental literature has largely taken for granted that heterogeneous risk
aversion is similar to homogeneous in all-pay auction settings in depressing efforts, e.g., that
the gender gap in competitiveness decreases when risk aversion is controlled for (Niederle,
2014). Our contribution is to show that this assumption is not warranted and indeed het-
erogeneous risk aversion is consistent with many different (and perhaps unexpected) forms
of behavior.
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6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If player i becomes more risk-averse (from U˜i to Ui), then the certainty equivalent of
winning v− x, with probability KU˜i(x), and −x, with probability
(
1−KU˜i(x)
)
, is less than
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zero, which is the certainty equivalent of this gamble with a utility function U˜i. Therefore,
the player can be restored to indifference between winning zero for sure and the gamble only
if the probability of winning the larger prize v − x increases. Thus, KUi(x) > KU˜i(x). For
loss-averse players, we rewrite their KUi(x) function as
KUi(x) =
−li(−x)
gi(v − x)− li(−x) = 1−
gi(v − x)
gi(v − x)− li(−x) .
Thus, when player i gets more loss-averse, li(−x) gets smaller and KUi(x) increases.
Proof of Corollary 2
If player s is more risk-averse than player t, where s, t ∈ B, then we have Ks(x) >
Kt(x) for x ∈ [0, v]. Based on the equilibrium strategy given in (4), the difference in the
distributions of their mixed strategies is:
Gs(x)−Gt(x) =
 ∏
16l6|B|
Kl(x)
 1|B|−1 (Ks(x)−1 −Kt(x)−1) 6 0.
Thus, player s’s expected bid is higher than player t’s and the cumulative distribution func-
tion of player s first-order stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution function of
player t. Therefore, the ranking of expected bids is the same as the ranking of risk aversion.
Proof of Corollary 3
The expected probability of winning for player s is given by (note that Ks (v) = Kt (v) =
1): ∫ v
0
Ks(x)dGs(x) = 1−
∫ v
0
Gs(x)dKs(x).
For player t: ∫ v
0
Kt(x)dGt(x) = 1−
∫ v
0
Gt(x)dKt(x).
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Thus, the difference between the probabilities of winning is:
∫ v
0
Ks(x)dGs(x)−
∫ v
0
Kt(x)dGt(x)
=
∫ v
0
[Gt(x)dKt(x)−Gs(x)dKs(x)]
=
∫ v
0
(∏
l∈B
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1 [
dKt(x)
Kt(x)
− dKs(x)
Ks(x)
]
. (18)
Therefore, the difference is non-negative if
dKt(x)
Kt(x)
− dKs(x)
Ks(x)
=
K ′t(x)
Kt(x)
− K
′
s(x)
Ks(x)
> 0,
for all x ∈ [0, v]8.
Proof of Corollary 4
To prove the corollary, consider the condition for the former equilibrium with the set B
of active players to exist, i.e.,
∏
l∈B
Kl (x) 6 min{Kj (x)|B|−1 , Ki (x)|B|−1}.
By the assumption that Ki(x) > Kj(x), it must be true that
Kj(x)
∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl (x) 6
∏
l∈B
Kl (x) 6 min{Kj (x)|B|−1 , Ki (x)|B|−1},
which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the latter equilibrium with the set B˜ to
exist.
8The reverse hazard rate dominance is not implied by the fact that Kt(x) first-order stochastically domi-
nates Ks(x). In fact, the reverse hazard rate dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance. However, it
is easy to show that the reverse hazard rate dominance condition is equivalent to first-order stochastic domi-
nance for CARA and CRRA utility functions. Appendix B in Krishna (2009) provides a useful introduction
to stochastic dominance.
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Proof of Proposition 2
When players are homogeneous, we have K1(x) = K2(x) = ... = Km(x). By the equilib-
rium strategy given in (4), the strategy under homogeneous risk aversion is specified by
Gi(x) = K(x)
1
|B|−1 ,
where i ∈ B. It is then obvious that any active player i’s bid is decreased in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance when all players become more risk-averse. The total expected
bid can be calculated as
R =
|B|∑
i=1
Ri =
|B|∑
i=1
∫ v
0
xdGi(x),
where
Ri =
∫ v
0
xdGi(x) = v −
∫ v
0
Gi(x)dx
is the expected bid of any player i. The second equality follows from integration by parts.
Since Gi(x) for i ∈ B is increased, Ri is decreased, and thus, the total expected bid R is
decreased when K (x) increases for x ∈ (0, v).
Proof of Proposition 3
An active player i’s expected bid is given by
Ri =
∫ v
0
xdGi (x) ,
where in equilibrium we have (from (4))
Gi (x) =
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1 .
Therefore, when Ki (x) changes to K˜i (x) > Ki (x) , then Gi (x) decreases for every x ∈ (0, v),
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and therefore, Ri increases. Moreover, for any other active players k ∈ B, k 6= i we have
Gk (x) =
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=i,k
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Kk(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1Ki (x)
1
|B|−1 .
Therefore, when Ki (x) changes to K˜i (x) > Ki (x) , then Gk (x) increases for every x ∈ (0, v),
and therefore, Rk decreases.
Proof of Proposition 4
As each player j’s expected bid can be written as Rj =
∫ v
0
xdGj(x), we can write the
total expected bid R as:
R =
∑
j∈B
Rj = |B| v −
∫ v
0
∑
j∈B
Gj(x)dx.
Rewrite the second term:
∫ v
0
∑
j∈B
Gj(x)dx =
∫ v
0
(
∏
l∈B
Kl(x))
1
|B|−1
∑
j∈B
Kj(x)
−1dx. (19)
Thus, the marginal effect of an increase of Ki(x) for every given x ∈ (0, v) on (19) can be
written as:
∫ v
0
d
(∑
j∈B Gj(x)
)
dKi(x)
dx
=
∫ v
0
1
|B| − 1
(∏
l∈B
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
−1
( ∑
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl(x)
−1 − (|B| − 2)Ki(x)−1
)
dx.
This expression is positive if
∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1− (|B|−2)Ki(x)−1 > 0 for all x ∈ [0, v], which
is condition (15). Therefore, the marginal effect on R is negative if the condition (15) is
satisfied.
Proof of Corollary 5
Based on Proposition 1, the sufficient and necessary conditions in the current context
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are:
K1(x)
nK2(x)
m−n 6 K2 (x)m−1 ,
for all x ∈ [0, v]. Rewrite (
K1(x)
K2(x)
)n
6 K2 (x)−1 ,
by log transformation,
n
m
6 lnK2(x)
−1
m (lnK1(x)− lnK2(x)) . (20)
Let the r.h.s. of inequality (20) be no less than one:
1
m
lnK2(x)
−1
lnK1(x)− lnK2(x) > 1.
After rearranging, we have
K1(x)
m 6 K2(x)m−1.
Therefore, whenever K1(x)
m 6 K2(x)m−1 for all x, we have that for all nm , there is an equi-
librium in which all players are active.
Proof of Corollary 6
Let µ = n
m
∈ {0, 1
m
, 2
m
, ..., m−1
m
} be the current share of K1(x) players. Substitute a K2(x)
player with a K1(x) player. Then, by Proposition 4, the total expected bid decreases if
K2(x) >
m− 2
µm
K1(x)
+ m−1−µm
K2(x)
. (21)
It can be verified that the r.h.s. of the above inequality is increasing with µ, and thus, is
less than m−2
m−1K1(x). Therefore, condition (17) is sufficient for condition (21), and we have
proved that increasing µ decreases total expected bid.
32
